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JURISDICTION QF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Cour t has e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of an 
a p p e a l from an o r d e r of t h e Utah Board of O i l , Gas and Mining 
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( c ) ( i v ) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES 
By order dated December 18, 1990, the Utah Supreme 
Court granted leave to Amici Curiae, the Rocky Mountain Oil and 
Gas Association and the Utah Petroleum Association (co l lec t ive ly 
referred to herein as "amici") . to f i l e th i s brief Amici Curiae. 
Amici respond only to those issues ra ised by appellant 
Sam H. Bennion ("Bennion") having s ign i f ican t policy implications 
such tha t they should be considered by the Supreme Court. Those 
issues are: 
1. Are the non-consent penalty1 provisions contained in 
the Utah forced pooling s t a t u t e fUtah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)] 
cons t i tu t iona l , both on t h e i r face and as applied to Bennion? 
Amici believe tha t the non-consent penalty represents a ra t iona l 
and economically sound l e g i s l a t i v e approach to encouraging 
prudent energy development in the State of Utah. The appl icat ion 
Respondent ANR Production Company has defined many of the t e chn i ca l terms 
r e f e r r ed to in t h i s proceeding in Section I I I of i t s b r ie f . Amici be l ieve tha t 
these d e f i n i t i o n s are he lpful and accu ra t e , and hereby adopt the d e f i n i t i o n s by 
r e fe rence . 
- 1 -
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of the statute to Bennion is reasonable under the factual 
circumstances presented here and is clearly constitutional. It 
should not be disturbed by this Court. 
2. Did the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the 
"Board") have authority to amend its 1981 order pooling interests 
in the drilling unit to impose a non-consent penalty upon Bennion 
for the costs of a second well in the unit? If so, should the 
Board' s decision doing so in this case be upheld? Amici believe 
that the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-
6-1 through -18 (1988) (the "Conservation Act"), generally, and 
the Utah forced pooling statute, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6, 
specifically, grant the Board this authority. Further, Amici 
believe that the Board7 s exercise of that authority here is 
supported by substantial evidence. Decisions such as this one 
are within the scope of the Board' s expertise in oil and gas 
matters, and therefore must be given substantial deference upon 
review by the Supreme Court. 
3. Does the Board's order violate the "Declaration of 
Public Interest" contained in the Conservation Act? Amici 
believe that, contrary to Bennion' s assertions, the attainment of 
the public interests set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 would 
be hindered significantly if Bennion' s positions were adopted. 
Amici therefore urge the Supreme Court to affirm the Board' s 
order and dismiss this appeal. 
-2-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves judicial construction of the non-
consent (risk-penalty) provisions of the Utah forced pooling 
statute. The forced pooling statute is part of the Conservation 
Act. 
Bennion appeals from the Board' s order dated 
September 20, 1990, imposing a non-consent penalty against 
Bennion of 175% of his proportionate share of drilling and 
completion costs for the Miles #2-lB5 Well in Duchesne County, 
Utah. The Board imposed the non-consent penalty because Bennion 
refused to participate in the drilling of the well by respondent 
ANR Production Company ("ANR"). Bennion challenges the 
constitutionality of the non-consent penalty set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) and also contests the statutory authority 
of the Board to impose the non-consent penalty in this situation. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Amici adopt by reference respondent ANR' s statement of 
the course of proceedings and disposition below. 
-3-
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C. Statement of Facts 
1. On June 24, 1971, the Board entered Its order in 
Cause No. 139-3 establishing a drilling (spacing) unit comprising 
Section 1 of Township 2 South, Range 5 West, U. S. M. The order 
was subsequently amended on September 20, 1972, in Cause No. 139-
8. Those orders authorized only one well to be drilled in the 
unit for production from the designated horizon, in concert with 
the existing statute. R. 3. 
2. Bennion owns an undivided 2. 94898% mineral interest 
in portions of Section 1. R. Exhibit 6, H4 at 7. 
3. On June 12, 1973, all owners of oil and gas leases 
and all owners of mineral interests in Section 1, except only 
Bennion, entered into a voluntary pooling agreement to authorize 
the drilling of an oil and gas well in the drilling unit. R. 3. 
4. On July 7, 1974, Shell Oil Company completed the Tew 
#1-1B5 Well (the "Tew Well") in the drilling unit as a well 
capable of producing oil in commercial quantities. R. 3. 
5. In 1977 Utah's forced pooling statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-6(6), was amended to require a penalty for non-
consenting owners. 
6. On April 4, 1981, the Board entered its order (the 
"1981 Order") in Cause No. 139-63 statutorily pooling the 
drilling unit effective as of July 26, 1979. Statutory pooling 
is frequently referred to in the industry as forced pooling. The 
-4-
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parties stipulated in the pooling order that Bennion would not be 
required to pay the statutory non-consent penalty. R. Exhibit 6. 
The 1981 Order is attached as Addendum #1 to this brief and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
7. Effective July 1, 1983, the Utah Legislature 
repealed the existing Oil and Gas Conservation Act and enacted a 
new statute. The new statute added several features not 
contained in the repealed version. Of particular import is new 
language that authorized the drilling of additional wells in 
established drilling units. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (Supp. 
1990). 
8. On August 1, 1986, ANR succeeded to the interest of 
Shell Oil Company in the drilling unit and took over operation of 
the well on December 1, 1986. ANR accounted to Bennion for all 
expenses incurred in the operation of the well, provided monthly 
invoices, and deducted his pro rata share of expenses from the 
monthly remittances of proceeds of production. R. 5. 
9. On April 12, 1985, the Board entered its order (the 
"1985 Order") in Cause No. 139-42 authorizing the drilling and 
simultaneous production of two wells from each drilling unit in 
the Greater Altamont-Bluebell-Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Area ("the 
Field"). R. Exhibit 6. Section 1 and the well in question here 
are located in Duchesne County in the Field. The 1985 Order is 
-5-
g:\wpc\160\00000rrs WR1 
attached as Addendum #2 to this brief and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
10. On February 6, 1990, ANR commenced drilling 
operations on the Miles #2-lB5 Well (the "Miles Well") in Section 
1. R. 6. 
11. On March 20, 1990, ANR sent a letter to Bennion 
inviting him to participate in the Miles Well and to pay his pro 
rata share of expenses. R. Exhibit 6D. In contrast to Bennion' s 
assertions in his brief, this offer required Bennion to pay his 
pro rata share of costs only, not 300% of those costs. I&. ; Q£. 
Bennion Brief at 8. The letter also included a geologic 
prognosis for the Miles Well, and a drilling prognosis was 
forwarded by ANR to Bennion under separate cover. R. Exhibits 3, 
6C, 6D. Bennion chose not to participate in the drilling of the 
Miles Well. R. Exhibit 6D. 
12. On April 10, 1990, ANR filed its Request for Agency 
Action in Cause No. 139-63, seeking an order of the Board either 
amending the original forced-pooling order to establish a non-
consent penalty for Bennion' s interest in the Miles Well or 
entering a new order to the same effect. 
13. On May 24, 1990, arguments of the parties were 
heard, and ANR introduced evidence regarding the costs of 
drilling to date and the estimated costs of drilling to 
completion. 
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14. At the May 24, 1990 hearing, a petroleum landman 
employed by ANR, Mr. David Laramie, testified that: 
a. Bennion had been offered an opportunity 
to sign the operating agreement for the unit, 
but had refused (Transcript p. 14); 
b. Each company that was a party to the 
unit operating agreement for Section 1 had an 
option to participate in the drilling of the 
Miles well or alternatively incur the 
contractual 300 percent non-consent penalty 
(Transcript p. 19); 
c. Companies having working interests 
comprising over 30% of the working interest in 
the unit elected not to participate in the Miles 
Well, and therefore voluntarily incurred the 
300% contractual non-consent penalty 
(Transcript, p. 22); 
d. The drilling of the Miles Well to 14,000 
feet involved inherent risks, including the 
possibility of mechanical problems and of 
uneconomic levels of production (Transcript p. 
29-30). 
15. After briefing by the parties, the Board entered its 
September 20, 1990 Order (the "1990 Order") that is the subject 
of this appeal. The 1990 Order amended the Board's 1981 Order to 
impose a non-consent penalty on Bennion of 175% of his 
proportionate share of drilling and completion costs for the 
Miles Well. A copy of the Order is attached as Addendum #3 to 
this brief and incorporated herein by reference. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The non-consent penalty2 provisions of Utah' s forced 
pooling statute, set forth in Utah Code Ann, § 40-6-6(6), are 
constitutional because they are rationally related to the Utah 
Legislature' s legitimate goal of encouraging the prudent 
development of Utah7 s oil and gas resources. In the absence of a 
risk-penalty system, the owners of oil and gas interests have an 
economic disincentive against participating financially in the 
drilling of wells. If no risk-penalty were assessed, such owners 
could obtain all the benefits of the well if it were successful, 
while paying none of the costs if it were not. Conversely, those 
drilling wells would share all of the benefits of their risk-
taking with "free-riders" such as Bennion, while bearing all of 
the costs of an unsuccessful well. The risk-penalty statute is a 
sensible legislative exercise of the police power, similar to 
both industry practice and the law of many other states, and 
should be given great deference by the Supreme Court. 
The statute is also constitutional as applied to 
Bennion. His claim that the Miles Well involved no risks, 
zThe terms non-consent penalty and risk-penalty are synonymous. H. Williams 
& C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 613, 849 (7th Ed. 1987). Williams and 
Meyers define a nonconsent penalty as "A penalty against a party to a . . . 
pooling or unitization agreement who did not agree in advance to participate in 
the costs of drilling, reworking, deepening, or plugging back of a particular 
well by the operator. . . The penalty may be in terms of acreage, production or 
cash. Industry practice in voluntary pooling agreements calls for non-consent 
penalties ranging from 200 to 300 percent for development wells. . . " Xd. at 
613. 
-8-
rendering the risk-penalty excessive, is contradicted by the 
weight of the evidence, which in any event must be construed in 
favor of the Board' s decisions. The Oklahoma cases cited by 
Bennion express a policy of protecting risk-taking operators 
against free-riding non-consenting owners--exactly the opposite 
of the policy advocated by Bennion. None of Bennion' s 
constitutional rights have been impaired here. 
The Board' s modification of its 1981 order force pooling 
Bennion' s interests in the unit, in order to impose the risk-
penalty upon Bennion, is within its statutory authority. 
Although the Conservation Act does not expressly mention 
modification of pooling orders, such power is impliedly within 
the Board' s authority. At the time of the 1981 order, infill 
wells such as the Miles Well were not permitted by statute or 
rule. Since that time, new geologic evidence has made it clear 
that second wells may be necessary to accomplish the statutory 
goal of ensuring maximum recovery of oil underlying drilling 
units in this area. This new evidence resulted in amendment of 
the Conservation Act and the Board' s 1985 Order authorizing 
second wells on drilling units in the Altamont field. It makes 
no sense to deny the Board authority to modify its previous 
orders to take into account increased geologic knowledge and 
statutory and regulatory changes. 
-9-
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The issue of "wellbore" pooling raised by Bennion is 
irrelevant. Bennion confuses the vesting of ownership interests 
in the unit upon creation of the drilling unit with the 
imposition of cost penalties upon his proportionate share of 
costs. Bennion has no vested right to obtain a free ride upon 
the drilling of a second well. 
The risk-penalty statute, and its application here, are 
necessary to fulfill the legislative purpose of encouraging 
prudent development while protecting the correlative rights of 
owners. Bennion' s correlative rights are not impaired. He could 
have obtained his share of production without suffering any 
penalty simply by participating in the drilling of the well. He 
chose not to pursue that course. The risk-penalty removes 
disincentives to risk-taking in the drilling of wells, while 
protecting correlative rights. It fulfills the legislative 
purpose of the Conservation Act, and should be upheld by the 
Supreme Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE NON-CONSENT PENALTY, AND 
ITS APPLICATION TO BENNION 
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD BY THIS COURT 
A. The Supreme Court Must Give Great Deference to Legislative 
Exercise of the Police Power. 
The Utah Legislature has expressly and clearly 
determined that the prudent development of Utah' s oil and gas 
resources is in the public interest. Utah Code Ann. §40-6-1 
provides: 
It is declared to be in the public interest to 
foster, encourage, and promote the development, 
production, and utilization of natural resources 
of oil and gas in the State of Utah in such a 
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and 
to provide for the operation and development of 
oil and gas properties in such a manner that a 
greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be 
obtained and that the correlative rights of all 
owners may be fully protected; to provide 
exclusive state authority over oil and gas 
exploration and development as regulated under 
the provisions of this chapter; to encourage, 
authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements 
for cycling, recycling, pressure maintenance, 
and secondary recovery operations in order that 
the greatest possible economic recovery of oil 
and gas may be obtained within the state to the 
end that the land owners, the royalty owners, 
the producers, and the general public may 
realize and enjoy the greatest possible good 
from these vital natural resources. 
g:\wpc\160\00000rrs.W51 
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The Utah Legislature has chosen to f u l f i l l th i s s t a tu to ry purpose 
through the enactment of the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 
1983, Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 through -18. 
Although th i s court has not had occasion to rule upon 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Utah' s o i l and gas conservation 
l e g i s l a t i o n , both federal and s t a t e courts have uniformly upheld 
s imi la r conservation l e g i s l a t i o n as a val id exercise of the 
pol ice power. See e. a. Hunter Co. v. McHuah, 320 U. S. 222, 64 
S. Ct. 19, 22 (1943); Miller v. Corporation Comm' n. , 635 P. 2d 
1006, 1007 (Okla. 1981); £££ also Annot. , Validity of Compulsory 
Pooling or Unitization Statutes, 37 A. L. R. 2d 434 (1954). 
Bennion contends tha t the r i sk-penal ty provisions of the 
forced pooling s t a t u t e se t forth in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) 
are unconst i tu t ional both fac ia l ly and as applied to him. These 
provisions are an in tegra l par t of the Utah Legis la ture ' s 
s t a tu to ry attempt to encourage o i l and gas production. By 
rewarding those who r i sk t h e i r time and capi ta l on the inherent ly 
uncer ta in venture of d r i l l i n g o i l and gas wells, while 
discouraging "free-riding11 by non-consenting owners, the r i s k -
penalty provisions encourage operators to undertake prudent 
development of the s t a t e ' s o i l and gas resources. 3 The Supreme 
3The d i s incent ive s to o i l and gas development created by the "free-ride" 
system advocated by Bennion are discussed in B. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and 
Uni t izat ion: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, J. Energy L. & 
Pol'y 265 (1986). See a lso Section I . B . , infra. 
- 1 2 -
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Court should give substantial deference to the Utah Legislature' s 
choice of specific means to advance the public welfare. Bastian 
v. King, 661 P. 2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983). The adjustment and 
accommodation of conflicting interests, such as those involved 
here, are for the Legislature rather than the courts to resolve. 
Id. Amici believe that the risk-penalty provisions represent a 
reasonable legislative accommodation of conflicting interests. 
The statute, and its application in the instant case by the 
Board, should be given great deference by the Supreme Court. 
B. The Risk-Penalty System Is Rationally Related to Reasonable 
Legislative Goals. 
The risk-penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-
6(6) are not unconstitutional on their face, and the Board's 
order applying the statute to Bennion in this instance does not 
violate his due process rights. In disposing of due process 
challenges to legislative enactments, this court has noted the 
tolerance with which it views economic legislation such as that 
being attacked here: 
The almost universal opinion that substantive 
due process was abused in invalidating economic 
regulations in the first third of this century 
has culminated in a rational basis test so 
tolerant that the substantive content of 
economic statutes rarely violates due process 
. . The presumption of constitutionality applied 
in these cases is further assurance that 
economic regulations will rarely be upset as 
violative of substantive due process. 
-13-
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Wells v. Children' s Aid Society of Utah. 681 P. 2d 199, 205 (Utah 
1984)(ci ta t ions omitted). 
In order to sus ta in economic l eg i s l a t i on , the court 
needs only to find tha t the law bears a reasonable r e l a t i o n to a 
leg i t imate s t a t e purpose. Murphv v. Matheson, 742 F. 2d 564,575 
(10th Cir. 1984), c i t i ng Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland. 437 
U.S. 117, 125, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (1978).4 The r i sk penalty 
s t a t u t e i s c lea r ly and r a t i ona l ly re la ted to a leg i t imate s t a t e 
purpose, and any detrimental effect upon Bennion' s i n t e r e s t i s 
far outweighed by the benefi ts of applying the s t a t u t e in 
s i t ua t ions such as t h i s . 
Bennion does not challenge the legitimacy of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e purpose expressed in the Conservation Act - the 
encouragement of prudent development of Utah' s petroleum 
reserves, while pro tec t ing cor re la t ive r igh t s . This purpose is 
served by imposing a r i sk-penal ty upon non-consenting owners 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6). 
The concept of a r i sk-penal ty i s simple. If the owner 
of an i n t e r e s t in a d r i l l i n g uni t chooses not to p a r t i c i p a t e in 
the d r i l l i n g of a well on the unit , tha t owner incurs no 
4The scope of due process p r o t e c t i o n s under A r t i c l e I , Sect ion 7 of the Utah 
C o n s t i t u t i o n has been considered comparable to t h a t under Sect ion 1 of the 
Four teenth Amendment to the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . In re N.H.B.. 777 P. 2d 
487, 489 n. 3 (Utah App. 1989). Federal cases i n t e r p r e t i n g the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process c lause support the p ropos i t i on tha t economic l e g i s l a t i o n 
need only r e l a t e r a t i o n a l l y to a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e purpose. See e .g . Murphy v. 
Matheson. supra . 
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liability or expense whatsoever for the costs of a dry hole. The 
non-consenting owner' s proportionate share of the drilling costs 
is instead borne by the participating parties. If production is 
achieved, the participating owners, who took the entire risk of a 
dry hole, are rewarded for the risk by recouping a premium in 
addition to the non-consenting owner' s proportionate share of 
costs. This premium is recovered from the non-consenting owner' s 
share of production from the well. Thus, under the Utah statute 
the non-consenting owner bears no downside risk. If the well is 
dry or sub-economic, the non-consenting owner pays nothing. If 
the well is successful, the non-consenting owner makes no out-of-
pocket expenditure. Rather his share of costs is recouped out 
of, and only out of, production. However, he must pay a premium 
for having avoided risk if the well produces. The consenting 
owners bear all downside risk, but are compensated for that risk 
if their decision to drill proves justified. 
Bennion' s position is that he should bear no risk for a 
dry hole should he choose in advance not to participate, but 
should receive all production attributable to his proportionate 
interests if the well is successful, without any risk-penalty. 
This position is aptly described by analogy in Kramer, Compulsory 
Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with 
Uncooperative Owners, 7 Journal of Energy L. & Pol' v 255 (1986). 
Kramer hypothesizes a gambler offering the reader $3,000,000 to 
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be wagered as directed by the gambler. If the wager is 
successful, the reader keeps all winnings beyond the original 
$3,000,000. If the wager fails, the reader owes the gambler 
nothing. Id. at 255. 
Kramer notes that while no rational gambler would ever 
make this offer, it is the situation applying in the absence of a 
risk-penalty. The non-consenting owner would receive a "free 
ride," bearing no risks, but sharing all winnings. Bennion' s 
position, if adopted, would give individual owners a clear 
incentive not to participate in the drilling of wells. 
Participating would place the owner' s capital at risk in the 
event of a dry hole, while all of the benefits of a productive 
well would be available without taking this risk. The unit 
operator, on the other hand, would be discouraged from drilling 
if it had to incur all of the dry hole risks while being forced 
to share the benefits of a successful well with those who had 
borne none of the risks. Id. at 264. This situation would 
discourage rather than encourage oil and gas production, and 
directly thwart the legislative purpose of promoting development 
of the state7 s oil and gas reserves. 
A number of major oil-producing states other than Utah 
have adopted the risk-penalty approach, including, among others, 
Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, and Texas. 
See e. a. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-116 (7) (b); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
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§ 30: 10A(2); Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-7(2)(g); Mont. Code Ann. § 
82-11-202(2)(b); N. M. Stat Ann. § 70-2-17(c); Tex Nat. Res. Code. 
Ann. § 102.052. Despite substantial litigation involving these 
statutes, the constitutionality of risk penalties has not been 
challenged in any reported decision. See 1 B. Kramer & P. 
Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization §12.03 (3d Ed. 1990). 
Further indication of the reasonableness of the risk-
penalty approach is found in its prevalence in private 
transactions. Standard form unit operating agreements, used 
throughout the oil and gas industry, permit working interest 
owners not to participate in drilling or reworking activities 
conducted on the unit. However, if they do choose not to 
participate, a variable risk penalty is imposed if production 
results from the activities. See e. a. AAPL 610 Model Form 
Operating Agreement, Art. VI (1989). Risk penalties are an 
accepted method of apportioning risk in private contracts 
negotiated freely and at arms length. The Utah Legislature' s 
adoption of the risk-penalty approach is rationally related to 
the legitimate purpose of facilitating oil and gas development in 
the State of Utah. Amici believe that Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) 
promotes economic rationality by penalizing those who would "free 
ride" upon the risk-taking of others. The risk-penalty statute 
should be upheld by this court. 
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II. 
THE IMPOSITION OF THE RISK-PENALTY UPON 
BENNION IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
A. Substantial Evidence Supports The Board/ s Decision. 
Bennion contends that the Board' s imposition of a risk-
penalty upon him is unconstitutional under the specific factual 
circumstances of this case. Bennion7 s primary contention is that 
the risk-penalty is excessive given the risks of the well 
involved, and therefore unconstitutionally unreasonable. 5 
Amici agree with Bennion7 s contention that the 
percentage of the risk-penalty should be related to the risks of 
the well involved. However, Amici believe that the Board acted 
reasonably in assessing the risks here, and that this Court 
should be reluctant to accept Bennion7 s invitation to second 
guess the Board7 s determination. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) treats different types of 
costs differently for penalty purposes. Costs of surface 
equipment, such as tanks and piping, are not subject to any 
penalty. Instead, the operator may recover only its actual co::s 
for such equipment from the non-consenting owner. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-6(6)(a). The reason for not imposing a penalty in this 
Mr. Bennion also contends that his rights in the unit vested at the time 
of the original pooling of the unit, and that imposition of a risk penalty on the 
second well in the unit impairs his vested rights, in violation of the due 
process and takings provisions of the Utah Constitution. This argument is 
discussed in Section II.B., infra. 
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s i t u a t i o n i s apparently because surface equipment can be sold if 
the well i s a dry hole, thereby reducing the ult imate r i sk to the 
operator from incurr ing such expenses. This provision i s 
exemplary of the care taken by the Utah Legislature to ensure 
tha t the penalty imposed i s linked to the r isks ac tua l ly taken by 
the operator. 
For d r i l l i n g costs , downhole equipment, and s imi lar 
items, the operator may recover from the non-consenting owner' s 
share of production from 150% to 200% of the non-consenting 
owner' s share of the costs . The specif ic percentage of cost 
recovery i s se t by the Board. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)(b) .6 
As discussed previously, these amounts may be recovered only from 
the non-consenting owner' s share of production. In the event of 
a dry hole, the non-consenting party bears no costs. 
Bennion at tacks the Board' s determination tha t ANR 
should be permitted to recoup 175% of Bennion' s share of d r i l l i n g 
costs from his share of production from the Miles Well. His 
basis for doing so i s tha t the r i sk of d r i l l i n g a dry hole at 
t h i s loca t ion i s "p rac t i ca l ly zero" and that , therefore, the 75% 
penalty i s unreasonably high. Bennion Brief at 19. This 
argument presents an un rea l i s t i c view of the r isks of d r i l l i n g 
bThe court should note that the 150%-200% range set forth in the s ta tute , 
and the 175% figure referred to by Mr. Bennion, are percentages of costs 
incurred. A penalty i s imposed only to the extent the percentage exceeds 100%; 
the penalty imposed by the Board in th i s case i s 75%. Mr. Bennion*s assert ion 
that the Board has imposed a 175% penalty i s therefore misleading. 
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the Miles 2-1B5 well, and would require this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the Board. 
Bennion supports his argument with selective excerpts 
from the testimony of Mr. David Laramie, a petroleum landman 
employed by ANR. As Bennion points out, Mr. Laramie did indicate 
that ANR had not drilled any dry holes in Duchesne County, and 
that the only other well within the specific unit had been 
economic. Bennion Brief at 19; May 24, 1990 transcript at 30. 
Yet Bennion fails to cite the more extensive testimony of Mr. 
Laramie concerning the risks of drilling an uneconomic well. 
Perhaps most telling is the decision of interest owners 
holding over 30% of the interests in the unit to "go non-consent" 
on the well. Those parties, unlike Bennion, had voluntarily 
executed the unit operating agreement for the well. May 24, 1990 
transcript at 13-14, 22. The operating agreement provides that 
parties choosing not to participate in a well have 300% of their 
proportionate share of costs recouped by the participating 
parties. May 24, 1990 transcript at 22. The operating 
agreement, freely entered by the parties to it, therefore 
provides for a non-consent penalty more than twice that imposed 
by the Board upon Bennion. 7 Yet the nonparticipating parties 
Under the operating agreement, the participating parties recoup 300% of 
non-participating parties proportionate costs; or a penalty of 200%. Under the 
Board's order, ANR can recoup 175% of Mr. Bennion*s proportionate share of costs, 
or a 75% penalty. 
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assessed the risks of the well as high enough that they would 
incur this penalty rather than participate in the well. If the 
well were a sure winner, as Bennion asserts, this decision would 
be irrational. While the risk of a dry hole may not have been 
large in this instance, it was indisputably present. Drilling 
wells is inherently risky. At the very best, a substantial risk 
existed that the proposed well, while not dry, might have been 
insufficiently productive to return the participating parties' 
entire investment. May 24, 1990 transcript at 30-31, 53-54. As 
another example, all drilling involves a risk of encountering 
unexpected mechanical problems that can force abandonment of a 
well. May 24, 1990 transcript at 30; see also Kramer, 
Compulsory Pooling, supra, at 266. Drilling for oil and gas is 
not, and is likely never to be, an endeavor guaranteed to 
succeed. The imposition of a risk penalty, even if a dry hole 
were improbable, was reasonable given these unavoidable 
realities. 
The cases cited by Bennion do not dictate a different 
conclusion. The South Dakota Supreme Court' s decision in In Re 
Kohlman, 263 N. W. 2d 674 (S. D. 1978), upheld a regulatory decision 
imposing a 100% penalty (as opposed to the 75% penalty imposed on 
Bennion), based upon the presence of a producing well 3/4 mile 
away. In Windsor Gas Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 529 S. W. 
2d 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), the Court upheld a regulatory 
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finding that a 200% penalty was unreasonable under the 
circumstances, based upon the long productive history of the 
surrounding field.8 In both instances, the determination of the 
regulatory body was a factual one, and was upheld by the 
reviewing court. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has similarly deferred to 
the findings of its Oil Conservation Commission in determining 
the reasonable extent of a risk-penalty in particular 
circumstances. In Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation 
Comm/ n, 672 P. 2d 280 (N. M. 1983), the court stated in upholding a 
risk-penalty order of the Commission: 
We must view the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences in the light most favorable to 
support the findings, and any evidence not 
favorable will not be considered. . . Special 
weight will be given to the experience, 
technical competence, and specialized knowledge 
of the Commission. 
672 P. 2d at 282. 
Bennion seeks to turn a disagreement with the Board' s 
factual determination in to a cons t i tu t iona l claim. Risks existed 
for ANR in the d r i l l i n g of the Miles 2-1B5 well, as they ex i s t 
for every well. The Board heard evidence from both s ides , and 
made a determination concerning the r i sk-penal ty to be applied 
8Under Texas law, the proponent of a well must make a "fair and reasonable" 
offer to nonconsenting owners before the Texas Railroad Commission (the Texas 
equivalent of the Utah Board of Oil , Gas & Mining) obtains j u r i s d i c t i o n over an 
appl icat ion to force-pool the non-consenting owners i n t e r e s t . Tex. Nat. Res. 
Code Ann. §102.013(b). 
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under the circumstances. The findings of administrative agencies 
within the areas of their technical expertise should be given 
deference by reviewing courts. Amici believe that the Board7 s 
decision in this matter is reasonable, and should be upheld. 
B. The Oklahoma Cases Cited bv Bennion Support RMOGA' s 
Position. 
Bennion also contends that his rights in the unit vested 
as of the time of the original forced pooling order for the unit, 
and that the Board' s order imposing a risk-penalty for the second 
well unconstitutionally violates those vested rights. The cases 
relied upon by Bennion support an opposite conclusion. Bennion 
relies entirely in this claim upon a line of Oklahoma cases 
culminating in two similar cases involving Amoco Production 
Company. Amoco ProflygtiQh Comply v. Corporation Comrn' n pf 
Oklahoma, 751 P. 2d 203, 207 (Okla. App. 1986) ["Amoco I"]; Amoco 
Production Company v. Corporation Comm' n of Oklahoma, 752 P. 2d 
835 (Okla. App. 1987)["Amoco II"]. The Amoco cases, and the 
other Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion, do involve the protection 
of vested rights. However, the rights protected by the Oklahoma 
courts have been those of unit operators, against free-riding 
interest owners such as Bennion. If this Court applies the 
reasoning contained in the Oklahoma cases, it must deny Bennion' s 
petition. 
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In order to understand the Oklahoma cases, it is 
initially necessary to understand a peculiarity of Oklahoma law 
not found in the Utah Conservation Act. In Oklahoma, unleased 
interest owners such as Bennion have an election at the time an 
initial well is proposed for a unit. The interest owner must 
either participate proportionately in the cost of the well or 
permanently forfeit his entire interest in the unit in return for 
a cash bonus or overriding royalty. See Kramer, supra, at 274-5. 
No provision is made for the non-consenting owner to retain any 
interest in the unit after payment of a risk-penalty. I_&. 
All the Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion essentially 
involve an attempt by a non-consenting owner to participate in a 
second well after going non-consent, and accepting a bonus, on 
the first well. For example, in Amoco I, the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission force-pooled a 640 acre drilling and 
spacing unit, and designated Amoco the operator of that unit. 
Amoco I. 751 P. 2d at 203. An interest owner, R&R Exploration 
Company, chose not to participate in an initial well proposed by 
Amoco for the unit. 1^. R&R Exploration, pursuant to the terms 
of the pooling order, received a 1/8 royalty on production, and 
was relieved of any obligation to contribute to the costs of the 
well. !£. The well was successful, and Amoco then planned 
another well for the unit. L&. A successor in interest to R&R, 
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Bartex Exploration, then requested to participate in the second 
well. L&. 
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission granted this 
request, but was reversed by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. The 
court held that once R&R elected not to participate on the first 
well, it was permanently divested of all interest in the unit. 
Conversely, the rights obtained by Amoco in the unit by virtue of 
R&R' s nonparticipation were vested and not subject to later 
extinguishment. 751 P. 2d at 207. The court in large part based 
its decision upon the unfairness to the operator of allowing a 
non-consenting party to wait until a successful well was drilled, 
and then seek to participate: 
The original election is based upon certain 
information, or lack of information. Good faith 
elections were made prior to the first well. It 
is not fair or just to alter the positions of 
the interest owners after the initial well is 
drilled. Once an operator relies on the unit 
that the Corporation Commission creates, new 
elections deprive the original risk capital 
investors of rights earned bv taking the risk of 
the initial well. The order of the commission 
granting a second election is a deprivation of a 
property right of the initial risk capital 
investor?, 
751 P. 2d at 207 (emphasis added). 
All the other Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion are based 
upon the same rationale as Amoco I. By taking the risk of 
participating in the initial well, the operator obtains rights in 
the unit that should not be divested in favor of previously non-
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consenting owners who seek to participate once the risks are 
lower. See e. g. Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm' n, 767 P. 2d 
404 (Okla. 1988); Amoco I. supra: Amoco II, supra: Helmerich & 
Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm' n. , 532 P. 2d 419 (Okla. 1975); 
Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. , 501 P. 2d 503 (Okla. 1972). At best 
for Bennion, the cases cited by him are distinguishable on the 
basis of Oklahoma' s different regulatory scheme. In the opinion 
of amici, the Oklahoma cases seek to achieve the same purpose as 
the Utah risk-penalty statute — encouraging development by 
removing disincentives to participation. 
The Oklahoma regulatory system, although far harsher on 
non-consenting parties than Utah' s risk-penalty provisions, has 
been upheld against due process and takings challenges. Anderson 
v. Corporation Commission, 327 P. 2d 699 (Okla. 1957). As 
discussed previously, the non-consenting, unleased owner in 
Oklahoma must permanently forfeit his interests in the unit in 
return for a cash bonus, and has no right whatsoever to 
participate in subsequent wells. Were Oklahoma law in effect 
here, Bennion would have received a cash payment prior to the 
drilling of the Tew Well, and lost all further rights in the 
unit. Because this payment would have occurred prior to the 
discovery of oil, it would have undoubtedly been quite small in 
relation to Bennion' s share of production from the two wells 
here, even after risk-penalties have been paid. The Anderson 
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court held that this type of regulation did not constitute a 
taking of the non-consenting owner' s property, because he had the 
right to participate in the well if he wished. 327 P. 2d at 703. 
Bennion has not suffered any constitutionally proscribed 
loss by the application of the risk-penalty here. Prior to the 
drilling of the Miles Well, he could have participated in the 
well on the same terms as any other party simply by paying his 
share of proportionate costs. See Statement of Facts, 11 11. He 
chose instead to let ANR take the risk, thus subjecting himself 
to the statutory risk-penalty. Any loss he suffered was strictly 
volitional. The proper exercise of the state' s police power, 
even though it may impair or destroy private property, is neither 
a taking nor violative of due process. See e. a. Alber v. Nolle, 
645 P. 2d 456, 461 (N. M. App. 1982); Cougar Business Owner' s Ass' n 
v. State, 647 P. 2d 481, 487-88 (Wash. 1982), cert, den. 459 U.S. 
971. The risk-penalty statute is precisely such a proper 
exercise of the Utah Legislature' s police power. 
R: \wDC\160\00000rrs.W51 
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III. 
THE BOARD ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN 
ITS AUTHORITY IN MODIFYING THE 1981 POOLING ORDER 
A. The Board Had Authority to Modify Its Previous Order Pooling 
Interests In the Drilling Unit-
Bennion also contests the Board' s authority to modify 
the previous pooling order for the drilling unit to impose the 
non-consent penalty for the second well in the unit. 
On April 30, 1981, the Board entered its order force 
pooling all interests (including Bennion's) in the drilling unit. 
The 1981 Order designated the Tew Well as the permitted well for 
the drilling unit. It required Bennion to pay his proportionate 
share of costs in the well, without any non-consent penalty.9 
See 1981 Oirder H 2-3. Bennion, for obvious reasons, wishes the 
cost allocation stipulation of the 1981 Order to apply, rather 
than the 1990 (modified) Order with its risk-penalty provisions. 
He therefore contends that the Board had no statutory authority 
to modify the 1981 Order to impose a risk-penalty at the time the 
second well was drilled on the unit. 
Amici believe that Bennion' s position is not only 
erroneous, but also would, if adopted, significantly hamper the 
yThe 1981 Order was based upon a stipulation of the parties to the forced-
pooling action that no penalty would be assessed against Bennion on the Tew Well. 
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Board' s ability to regulate oil and gas development in the state 
of Utah. The Conservation Act gives the Board broad authority to 
regulate "all operations for and related to the production of oil 
or gas . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5(3)(a). This authority 
includes express authority to enter orders "pooling all interests 
in the drilling unit for the development and operation [of the 
Unit]." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5). Bennion argues that because 
the statute does not expressly state that pooling orders may be 
modified, the Board had no authority to modify its previous order 
to impose the non-consent penalty here. 
This argument is contrary to law and reason. The broad 
statutory powers of the Board to regulate oil and gas 
development, and its specific authority to enter force pooling 
orders, give it the inherent power to modify its own pooling 
orders. The authority of administrative agencies is not limited 
to those powers expressly granted by statute. It includes all 
powers that may fairly be implied from the statute. Wimberly v. 
NQW Mexico $t»t9 PQUgg gfl- , 497 P. 2d 968 (N. M. 1972); ££& fllgQ 
Ricker v. Board of Ed. of Millard County. 396 P. 2d 416 (Utah 
1964) (law favors giving agency free hand within its sphere of 
responsibilities). Other state courts have specifically held 
that agencies regulating oil and gas development have the power 
to modify their own orders. See Railroad Commission v. Aluminum 
Corp. of America. 380 S. W. 2d 599, 602 (Tex. 1964) (regulatory 
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agency may modify previous orders upon changed circumstances); 
see also Vierson v. Bennett. 353 P. 2d 114, 118-119 (Okla. 1960); 
Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. , 244 P. 2d 852, 858 (Okla. 1951). 
Given its broad powers to regulate oil and gas development, the 
Board has the implied power to modify its own existing pooling 
orders. 
A contrary conclusion—such as that argued by Bennion--
would prevent the Board from reacting to changed circumstances, 
and would simply be bad policy. It is instructive to review how 
circumstances changed between the time of the 1981 Order and the 
Board's modification of that order. The 1981 Order did not 
address the drilling of additional wells. Until the 1983 
amendment of the Conservation Act, the drilling of additional 
wells on a particular unit was not statutorily authorized. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(4). After the Utah Legislature 
authorized the drilling of increased density wells on drilling 
units in 1983, the Board held hearings and took evidence upon 
whether increased density wells were necessary to permit full 
recovery of oil and gas underlying drilling units in the 
Altamont-Bluebell field. The Board expressly found that, due to 
the discontinuous nature of the productive beds in the Lower 
Green River/Wasatch formations, a single well would not 
effectively drain the recoverable oil and gas underlying any 
given 640 acre spacing unit. 1985 Order, p. 5, U 5-7. It 
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therefore ordered that an additional well could be drilled on 
each established drilling unit in the Altamont-Bluebell field. 10 
1985 Order, p. 8, 11 B. 
These changed circumstances clearly justify the Board's 
modification of the 1981 Order, the forced-pooling order, in the 
manner it did here. At the time the 1981 Order was issued, 
neither the Board nor the parties contemplated that an additional 
well would be necessary to recover all oil underlying the unit. 
Now that this fact has been recognized, it does not make sense to 
deny the Board the ability to modify its prior orders to take 
into account changed circumstances. The Supreme Court should 
uphold the Board' s determination that it had authority to modify 
the 1981 Order. 
B. No Vested Rights Were Impaired By the Board' s Action. 
Bennion also attacks the Board' s modification of the 
1981 Order on the ground that that order vested all interests in 
the unit at the time it was entered. He therefore contends that 
it was beyond the authority of the Board to modify his rights as 
an owner of the unit at the time the second well was drilled, by 
modifying the 1981 Order to impose a non-consent penalty for the 
Miles Well. 
10The 1985 order expressly includes the drilling unit in question here. 
1985 Order, p. 4. 
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Bennion' s argument is based upon his failure to discern 
the difference between the issue of ownership in the unit and the 
issue of his obligation to either participate in additional wells 
or bear the statutory non-consent penalty. While his interest in 
the drilling unit - his 2. 94898% unleased mineral interest set by 
the 1981 Order - could not be modified upon the determination 
that a second well should be drilled on the unit, that fact has 
no bearing upon his option to participate in the well. 
The Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion in support of this 
argument are inapposite at best. Amici have previously discussed 
the profound differences between Oklahoma' s regulatory system and 
that created by the Utah legislature. See Section II.B., supra. 
In Oklahoma, a non-consenting interest owner forfeits all working 
interest in the drilling unit for all time when the unit is 
pooled, in return for a one-time cash bonus or an overriding 
royalty. All the Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion have involved 
attempts by originally non-consenting owners such as Bennion to 
participate in a second well after an initial successful well on 
the unit. See e. a. , Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. supra, 501 P. 2d 
at 507; Amoco I, 751 P. 2d at 207; Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation 
Comm' n. supra. 767 P. 2d at 405. The Oklahoma Courts have 
consistently held that, in order to protect the risk-taking 
operator, non-consenting owners must be denied any participation 
in second wells on the drilling unit. Amoco I, supra. 751 P. 2d 
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at 207. The non-consenting owner chose not to risk participation 
in the first well when the risks were high; he should not be 
allowed to participate when an initial discovery well has reduced 
the risks of a second well. !£. This is the reason Oklahoma 
courts have disapproved of "wellbore" pooling - it can permit 
non-consenting owners to free-ride upon the risk-taking of 
others. 
The Oklahoma cases cited by Bennion can therefore 
readily be distinguished, both on the basis of Oklahoma' s 
radically different regulatory system and of the policy reflected 
in the decisions. Amici believe that the ltwellbore,, pooling 
issue raised by Bennion is simply irrelevant. It seems 
undisputed by any party to this appeal that the ownership 
interests of the parties were fixed at the time of the original 
pooling. The Board' s order imposing the non-consent penalty in 
this case did not change those interests in any way. Bennion' s 
ownership interest in the unit has not been impaired; he has 
simply been required to pay a penalty, based upon his unchanged 
proportionate interest, because he chose not to participate in 
the drilling of the Miles well. 
C. The BQflrfl Ne$fl NQt Mjikq Any Finding Qf Economic Feasibility 
Prior to Allowing Second Wells. 
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The 1985 Order, which permitted second wells to be 
drilled on existing units in the Altamont and Bluebell fields, 
provided in part as follows: 
C. Additional wells may be drilled at the 
option of the operator of the unit, based upon 
geologic and engineering data for that unit 
which will justify the drilling of an additional 
well in order to recover additional oil, 
provided the additional well appears to be 
economically feasible. 
D. Economic feasibility means that a 
prudent operator would have a reasonable 
opportunity to recover the costs of drilling, 
completing, producing and operating the well, 
plus a reasonable profit. 
1985 Order, H C-D, at 8. 
Bennion argues that this language requires the operator 
to provide data to the Board concerning the economic feasibility 
of infill wells on the units covered by the 1985 Order and 
requires the Board to make a positive finding of economic 
feasibility prior to authorizing infill wells11. 
The 1983 amendments to the Conservation Act do not 
require the Board to approve the drilling of infill wells on 
existing units, and the 1985 order provides that second wells may 
be drilled at the option of the operator. Amici believe that 
this determination should be left to the operator, rather than 
requiring a determination by the Board of economic feasibility. 
nThe court should note the contradiction between Bennion*s argument that 
the Miles Well was essentially risk free, and his apparent belief that the well 
was not economically feasible. 
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Unit operators will not choose to spend a million dollars or more 
on a second well unless they perceive it to be economic. A 
requirement that they prove economic feasibility before the Board 
would seem redundant. Operators are in the best position to 
determine economic feasibility. Amici believe that this decision 
does not require Board supervision. 
IV. 
THE BOARD'S ORDER IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE STATUTORY 
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
The public interest expressed in the legislative 
statement of purpose set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 is 
served by the Board' s order. Bennion insists that his 
correlative rights to produce his share of oil and gas from the 
pool have in some way been violated. Bennion Brief at 36. While 
protection of correlative rights is indeed one of the 
legislature' s goals12, Bennion' s rights have not been violated 
here. 
The pooling orders in question do deprive Bennion of his 
common law rights to drill a well to produce his share of the 
^Bennion conveniently neglects to mention the equally important legislative 
goal of encouraging development of Utah* oil and gas resources. As Amici have 
discussed in this brief, the positions advocated by Bennion would create 
disincentives to development of the resource, in derogation of the legislative 
purpose. 
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petroleum underlying the unit. Yet in order to protect his 
correlative rights, he need only be given the right to 
participate in the well(s) being drilled by the unit operator. 
Anderson v. Corporation Comm' n. , supra, 32 7 P. 2d at 70 3; see also 
Ward v. Corporation Comm' n. , supra, 501 P. 2d at 507. Bennion, 
prior to the drilling of both the Tew and Miles Wells, had this 
right. He could have received his proportionate share of 
production without penalty simply by agreeing to participate in 
the drilling of the wells. He chose not to exercise this option. 
His correlative rights have been protected. 
CONCLUSION 
The risk-penalty provisions of the Conservation Act 
provide a rational and economically sound method of promoting oil 
and gas development in the State of Utah. Drilling for oil and 
gas is inherently a risky and expensive proposition. Bennion, in 
seeking to invalidate the risk-penalty, wishes to avoid the risks 
involved in this activity, while sharing all of the benefits. 
His position, if adopted by the Supreme Court as the law of Utah, 
would deter unit operators from taking the risks necessary to 
develop Utah' s oil and gas resources. Bennion similarly urges 
this Court to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the Board7 s 
authority and actions in the very areas it was legislatively 
-36-
created to regulate. Amici believe that the Board acted legally, 
properly and within its authority. The positions taken by 
Bennion represent bad policy and bad law. His appeal should be 
denied. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John 
Attorneys for Amici Curiae 
50 South Main Street, #1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
g: \wpc\160\00000rrs.W51 
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ADDENDUM #1 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE HATTER OF THE APPLICATION ) 
OF S, E. BENNION FOR AN ORDER ) 
POOLING INTEREST IN THE DRILLING ) ORDER 
UNIT COMPRISED OF SECTION 1, ) 
TOVrNSHIP 2 SOUTH OF RANGE 5 WEST, ) Cause No. 139-13 
UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN, DUCHESNE ) 
COUNTY, UTAH ) 
) 
This cause came on for hearing before the Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, the State 
of Utah, at 10:00 a.m., on Thursday, July 26, 1979, in the 
:xecutive Conference Room, Holiday Inn, 1659 West North Temple, 
lalt Lake City, Utah, pursuant to the Amended Application of 
>. H. Bennion {*Bennion") and to notice to all interested par-
lies duly and regularly given by the Board, to consider forced 
pooling of the uncommitted interest of Bennion in the above-
:aptioned drilling unit, and other matters as set forth in the 
Amended Application -and -Notice -of Hearing. 
The following members of the Board were present: 
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman 
Edward T. Beck 
C. Ray Juvelin 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
John L. Bell 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B. Feight, Director 
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant 
Frank M. Hamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer 
Michael, Minder, Geological Engineer 
Denise A, Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney Ge*< 
Appearances were made as follows: 
S. H, Bennion, for himself 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. B. Bennion 
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory T. 'Williams, Counsel tor S>.ell Oil Company 
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, State 
of Utah, on October 24, 1979, at the Wildlife Resources Audi-
torium, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Board members were pre* t: 
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman 
John L. Bell 
C. Ray Juvelin 
E, Steele Mclntyre 
Constance K. Lundberg 
Edward T, Beck 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B, Feight, Director 
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant 
Frank M. Haraner, Chief Petroleum Engineer 
Michael Minder, Geological Engineer 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Asiistant Attorney Genera 
Appearances were made as follows: 
5. H. Bennion, for himself 
peter Stirba, Counsel for S. R. Bennion 
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, State 
of Utah, on December 18, 1980, at the Wildlife Resources Audi-
torium, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Board members were present: 
John L. Bell, Co-Chairman 
Charles Henderson 
Thadis W. Box 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
C. Ray Juvelin 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B. Feight, Director 
Ron Daniels, Coordinator 
Mike Minder, Petroleum Engineer 
Paula Frank, Secretary 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney Genera 
Appearances were made as follows: 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. H. Benr.ion 
Lowell Kirkpatrick, for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
NOW, THERFORE, the Board, having considered the > 
matters presented at said hearings and the remarks and the 
stipulations of counsel, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS 
1, That due and regular notice of the time, place, 
and purpose of said hearings was given to all interested par-
ties in the form and manner and within the time required by lav 
2. That the Board has jurisdiction over the matters 
covered by the Amended Application and all of the parties 
interested therein, and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate 
the Order hereinafter set forth. 
3. That Bennicn is the record owner of an unleased, 
undivided one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas and min-
erals located in the NEV SWk and NW>i SE*x of Section 1, Township 
2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special Meridian, Duchesne 
County, Utah, 
4. That by Order in Cause No. 139-3, entered June 24, 
1971, as amended by Order in Cause No. 139-8, entered September, 
20, 1972, the Board established said Section 1, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West, Unitah Special Meridian, as a drilling and 
spacing unit for the production of oil, gas, and associated 
hydrocarbons from the spaced interval described in said orders; 
that Shell Oil Company has drilled the TEW 1-1S5 well in said 
Section 1 which is producing from said interval and is the per-
mitted well for said drilling unit. 
5. That said Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 
West, Uintah Special Meridian, contains 678.2 acres; and that 
Bennion's interest in said drilling and spacing unit is a 
2.948981 interest. 
6. That Shell is the major working interest owner and. 
is the sole operator within said drilling unit; and that Shell 
is willing to let Bennion share in the proceeds of production 
of said unit from first production. 
7. That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this 
cause dated March 26, 1980, all interests in the drilling unit 
comprised of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah 
Special Meridian, in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County, 
Utah, were pooled for the development and operation of said 
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights, 
effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 25, 1979. 
8. That Bennionfs proportionate share of the net rev 
enue from the production of the subject well up to 6:00 a.m., 
Mountain Daylight time on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41 which 
consists of the following: 
Working Interest Accumulations 
Revenue 
Oil $101,608.86 
Gas 3,482.23 
Total 105,091.09 
Expenditures 47,203.16 
NET $57,887.93 
Royalty Interest Accumulations* 
Oil $13,872.44 
Gas 462.04 
Total $14,334.48 
Total Accumulations 
Working Interest $57,887.93 
Royalty Interest 14,334.48 
Total $72,222.41 
(•Based on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately re-
duced, until payout. Upon payout this royalty merges with and 
is included in the working interest.) 
9. That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this 
cause dated March 26, 1980, Shell paid the Division of Oil, Gas, 
and Mining the sum of $72,222.41 which sum was placed in a 
5-
six-month money market certificate as directed by counsel for 
Bennion and Shell; that the original certificate earned inter-
est in the amount of $3,917.69; and that the original sum and 
interest were invested in a new certificate which bears inter-
est at the rate of 13.519* and will mature on Kay 6, 1S81. 
10. That Bennion has conducted an audit of Shell's 
records relating to the subject well at Shell's offices in 
Houston, Te--: and has submitted a report relating to such 
audit to the Board. 
11. That it is the practice of the industry to con-
duct an audit of an operator's records at the office where the 
operator maintains such records; and that there are standard 
accounting procedures in the industry relating to such audits. 
oapra 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY TEE BOARD: 
1. That all interests in the drilling unit comprised 
of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special 
Meridian, in the Xltamont Field of Duchesne County, Utah, be aq 
the same are pooled for the development and operation of said 
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights, 
effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979. 
2. That the TEW 1-1B5 well located in said Section 1 
is the permitted well for said drilling unit. 
3. That Bennion is entitled to receive from Shell 
Bennion's proportionate share of production of oil, gas liq-
uids, and natural gas in-kind produced from the subject well 
from and after 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979 
upon payment of Bennion's proportionate share of the monthly 
operating expense of said well; that Shell will tender Bennion 
invoices for his proportionate share of the monthly operating 
expense in the same manner and in the same detail as if Bennion 
had signed the Operating Agreement in effect fcr said unit; 
that in the event Bennion fails to pay his proportionate share 
of the monthly operating expense within 15 days of invoice, 
Shell shall have a first and preferred lien on Bennion's inter-
est in production and shall be entitled to withhold the amount 
of said production in an amount equal to Bennion's share of the 
operating expense plus interest at the prevailing rate until 
such payment is received; and that should such default continue 
for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of invoice, Shell 
shall be entitled to retain Bennion's proportionate share of 
production to the extent of Shell's lien or to tender the pro-
duction withheld pursuant to Shell's lien to Bennion and pursue 
other available legal remedies. 
4. That Bennion's interest in said drilling unit is a 
2.94898% interest. 
5. That Bennion is not entitled to share in production 
occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time on July 2b, 
1979, in-kind but is entitled to share in the proceeds of such 
production; that the amount to which Bennion is entitled with 
respect to production occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain 
Daylight time on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41; and that the Board 
shall transfer ownership of the money market certificate purchasec 
pursuant to the Interim Order dated March 26, 1980, to Bennion. I: 
addition, Shell shall pay Bennion the sum of $2,S04.00, represent-
ing interest at 6 percent per annum on Bennion's statutory royalt> 
interest for the period from first production until the purchase 
of the original money market certificate. 
*6. That any further audit of Shell's records relating 
to the subject drilling unit which Bennion wishes to conduct 
shall be performed at Bennion's expense at the location at vhic! 
such records are kept; and that any such audit shall be con-
ducted pursuant t~ the accounting procedures of the industry. 
DATED this ^lS day of O\o^j , 1981 
'J 
STATS OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
£>J? / / / . . . : ^ (Lis.**, / r O l 
Charges R. Henderson, Cnairr.an 
rd T. 3ec*~" 
r - " v 
\ 2^/(1 
LJ 
^ 
John L. B e l l / 
Thadis W. Sex 
r-f£*rlr tifcjiifa r 
£ . S t e e l e Mclntyre j 
V \ 
Robert R. Nor-an \ 
Margaret Bird 
ADDENDUM #2 
EXHIBIT "B" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDED 
PETITION OF AMR LIMITED INC., 
ET AL. FOR AN ORDER MODIFYING 
PREVIOUS ORDERS WHICH 
ESTABLISHED DRILLING AND 
SPACING UNITS AND ANY OTHER 
ORDERS RELATING TO TEST WELLS 
FOR THE-AlTAMONT, BLUEBELL 
AMD'.CEDAR RIM-SINK DRAW 
FIELDS, DUCHESNE AND UINTAH 
COUNTIES, UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Docket No. 85-.0C7 
Cause No. 139-42 
Pursuant to the Amended N o t i c e of Eearing dared March 
of t h e Board of O i l , Gas and Mining ("Board"), Department 
:ai Resources of the S t a t e of Utah, s a i d cause came en f c : 
on Thursday, Apri l 1 1 , 1985 at 10:00 a.m. in t h e Beard 
the D i v i s i o n of O i l , Gas and Mining ( " D i v i s i o n " ) , 355 
:th Temple, 3 Triad Center , S u i t e 3 0 1 , S a l t Lake Ci ty , 
4 , 1985 
of Natu, 
hear ing 
Root:, of 
West No, 
Utah. 
The f o l l o w i n g members of t h e Board v e r e p r e s e n t : 
Gregory P. W i l l i a m s , Chairman 
James W. Carter 
Char les P.. Henderson 
Richard B. Larson 
E. S t e e l e Mclntyre 
John H. Garr, having r e c u s e d h i m s e l f , 
d id not p a r t i c i p a t e 
Mark C. Moench, Assistant Attorney General, was present 
on behalf of the Board, 
Members of the Staff of the Division present and 
participating in the hearing included: 
Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director 
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director 
John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer 
Barbara W. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, was 
present on behalf of the Division. 
Appearances were made as follows: Petitioners AKR 
Limited/ ££ £1./ by Frank Douglass, Esq. and Ray E. Lar.cenberc, 
Austin, Texas; Robert G. Pruitt, Jr., Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Frank J. Gustin, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah; Louis A. Pcsekany, 
Jr., General Counsel, and George W. Eeiistrom, Esq., ANR 
Production Company; Phillip K. Chattin, General Counsel, Ctsx Oil 
Company; Hugh C. Garner, Esq., for Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation; 
Phillip William Lear, Esq., for Phillips Petroleum Company; 
Jeffrey R. Young, Esq., for Bow Valley Petroleum, Inc.; E. J. 
Lewis, Esq., Vice President, and Robert W. Adkins, Esq., Linmar 
Energy Corporation; Robert Buettner, Esq., Koch Exploration 
Company; Lane Jamison, Esq., Sonat Exploration Company; Vic-or 
Brown and Robert Brown, Utah Royalty Association; John Earja, 
Esq., Gulf Oil Corporation; Martin Seneca, General Counsel, Ute^ 
Indian Tribe; Assad H. Raffoul, Petroleum Engineer, Bureau of 
Land Management; John Chasel, on his own behalf; George Morris, 
Esc.r Ute Distribution Corporation; Dr. Gilbert Miller, 
Conservation Superintendent, Anarada Hess Corporation; and L. A. 
Pike, Roosevelt, Utah, landowner. 
Now t h e r e f o r e , the Board having considered the 
tes t imony of the w i tnes se s , John C. Osmond, Petroleum Geologis t ; 
Clarke G i l l e s p i e , Petroleum Reservoir Engineer; and R. Thayr.e 
Robson, Economist, for P e t i t i o n e r s and B. J . Lewis, Vice 
P r e s i d e n t , and John W. Clark, Petroleum Engineer, for Linmar 
Energy Corpora t ion , and the e x h i b i t s rece ived a t sa id hearing and 
being f u l l y advised in the premises , now makes and e n t e r s the 
fo l l owing : 
1 . Due and regu la r no t ice of the t ime, place and 
purpose cf the hear ing was given to a l l i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s as 
r e q u i r e s by law and the ru l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s of the Board. 
2 . The Eoard has j u r i s d i c t i o n over the ma t t e r s covered 
by s a id n o t i c e and over a i l p a r t i e s i n t e r e s t e d t h e r e i n and has 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to make and promulgate any order h e r e i n a f t e r set 
3 . The Board has he re to fo re en te red 640 acre d r i l l i n g 
and spacing o rde r s for the Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation in 
Causes No. 1 3 9 - 3 , 139-4, 139 -5 , 139-8 , and 139-17 (Altaaor.r 
F i e l d ) , Causes No. 131-11 , 131-14, 131-24, 131-27, 131-32, 131-
33 , 131-34, 131-45 and 131-55, (Bluebel l F i e l d ) , and Causes No. 
140-6 and 140-7 (Cedar Rim-Sink Draw Fie ld) as to the fol lowing 
d e s c r i b e d l ands : 
UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN 
S e c t i o n s : 19-36 
Towncrnn 1 Nor th , Ranop ? Wpst 
S e c t i o n s : 19-36 
Township i N o r t h , Rsngp 7 W P ^ 
S e c t i o n s 2 3 - 2 6 , 35 and 36 
T o u n s h i o 1 Sou th , Rar.ne 1 Fac t 
S e c t i o n s : A l l ( e x c e p t R o o s e v e l t U n i t ) 
Township 1 Sou th , Ranee 7 E a s t 
S e c t i o n s : 4 - 8 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 30-31 
Tcvrisr. ip 1 South , RS"CP 1 West 
S e c t i o n s : A i l ( e x c e p t R o o s e v e l t Un i t ) 
Township 1 S o u t h , Ranee 7 ' t h r o u g h i Wept 
S e c t i o n s : A i l 
Township 1 South , P.ance 5 West 
S e c t i o n s : 1 0 - 1 7 , 20-36 
Township 1 P o p t h . Rang* fi West 
S e c t i o n s : 2 5 - 2 6 , 35-36 
Township 2 Sou th , Rarce 1 t h r o u g h 7 Fa«t 
S e c t i o n s : A i l 
Township 2 Sou th , Ranee 1 t h r o u c h 6 West 
S e c t i o n s : Al l 
Township 7 So-'th , Ran.ce 7 West 
S e c t i o n s : 1 9 , 30-36 
Township ? S o u t h , Range fl West 
S e c t i o n s : 2 3 - 2 6 , 31-36 
Township 3 Sou th , Range 3 West 
S e c t i o n s : 5 - S , 1 7 - 2 0 , 29-32 
Township 3 S o u t h . Ranee 4 t h r o u g h R Wegt 
S e c t i o n s : A l l 
Township A Sou th . Range 3 West 
Sections: 5 and 6 
Township 4 S o u t h . Ranee 4 West 
S e c t i o n s : 1-6 
Tnwncnip 4 Sou th . RanO P g West 
S e c t i o n s : 1-6 
Township 4 South , P.ar.ce 6 West 
S e c t i o n s : 1-18 
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Townchip 5 South , ^ n c e 19 Eas t 
S e c t i o n s : 2 0 - 2 3 , 2 6 - 2 3 , 32-35 
Township 6 Sou th , R ^ C P iq p a s t 
S e c t i o n s : 3 - 5 , 9 , 1 0 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 2 2 , 27 
and 34 
4. In Cause No. 140-12, the Board authorized the 
drilling of test or second wells that may only be produced 
alternatively with the initial well on the sane drilling unit. 
5. The Lower Green Riv'er/Wasatch Formation underlying 
tne subject fields constitutes a pool as that tern is defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-2(5) (1953, as amended), and is a highly 
complex series of isolated and discontinuous beds of productive 
rock that are randomly distributed vertically over a several 
thousand feet thick interval. Normally, the productive beds are 
separate and distinct and not in communication with each other. 
6. Many of the productive beds are not correlatable 
from well to well and will not afford communication between wells 
as close as 1000 feet. Of the productive beds that correlate, 
various geological factors prevent a significant number form 
communicating between wells within the same section. 
7« Geologic and engineering information from initial 
unit wells and test wells show that a single well will not 
effectively drain the recoverable oil and gas underlying any 
given 640 acre spacing unit because the productive beds are too 
small or have other l imit ing cha rac t e r i s t i c s precluding effective 
and ef f ic ient drainage of the recoverable reserves underlyinc the 
un i t . 
8. Data from production logs and f i e ld performance 
show tha t t e s t wells d r i l l ed under the Order in Cause No. 140-12 
af ter 1978 have caused the recovery of substant ia l amounts of oil 
from separate and d i s t i n c t productive beds and from previously 
undepleted productive beds, and tha t the d r i l l i n g of additional 
wells on ex is t ing uni ts j/ill._ijicriease _the ultimate recovery cf_ 
o_il_. f rpm__the_subj ect f ie lds . 
9. The prohibi t ion of simultaneous production from the 
i n i t i a l well and t e s t well on the same unit has caused the 
shutt ing in of wells with the potent ia l to produce jubstant ia l^ 
amounts of addi t ional reserves . 
10. Each addit ional well d r i l l ed under t h i s order wil l 
tap producing formations that are separate and d i s t i n c t from and 
not in communication with any other producing formation and is 
not an unnecessary wel l . 
1 1 . In some areas of the subject f i e l d s , geologic, 
engineering, and economic fac tors jus t i fy d r i l l i n g addi t ional 
wells on ex is t ing u n i t s . In other areas , geologic, engineering 
and economic fac tors may not j u s t i f y d r i l l i n g addi t ional wells on 
ex is t ing u n i t s . 
raw CUSTOMS OP LAW 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and 
- * -
purpose of the hearing was given to all interested parties as 
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the matters covered 
by said notice and over all parties interested therein and has 
jurisdiction to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set 
forth. 
3. The Beard is authorized to modify its previous 
orders to permit additional wells to be drilled within 
established units under Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6(4) (1953/ as 
amended). 
4. An order permitting (a) the drilling of additional 
wells on existing units as provided herein and (b) the 
simultaneous production of initial wells and additional wells 
will prevent the waste of hydrocarbons/ prevent the drilling of 
unnecessary wells, and protect correlative rights. 
ORDER 
.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
To prevent waste of oil/ gas and associated liquid 
hydrocarbons/ to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, to 
protect correlative rights and to maintain, to the maximum extent 
practicable, drilling units of uniform size and shape for the 
promotion of more orderly development of the lands described in 
Finding of Fact No. 3 above/ the following order is hereby 
promulgated to govern operations in said area effective as of 
April 12/ 1985: 
-7-
A. Upon the effective date any and all orders of the 
Board heretofore promulgated which are inconsistent with the 
orders herein set forth shall be and are hereby vacated to the 
extent inconsistent herewith. 
B. Additional wells may be drilled, completed, and 
produced on established drilling units comprising government 
surveyed sections of approximately 640 acres (or other designated 
drilling units so long as such unit is at least 400 acres in 
size) to a density of no greater than two producing wells en each 
unit comprising a section (or other designated unit). 
C. Additional wells may be drilled at the option of 
the operator of the unit, based upon geologic and engineering 
cata for that unit which will justify the drilling of an 
additional well in order to recover additional oil, provided the 
additional well appears to be economically feasible. 
D. Economically feasible means that a prudent operator 
would have a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs cf 
drilling, completing, producing and operating the well, plus a 
reasonable profit. 
£. It is not the intent of this order, in permitting 
additional wells to be drilled on established drilling units, to 
change or amend the existing contractual rights or relationships, 
express or implied, of any parties who share in production or the 
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area* 
F. Any additional well must be located at least 1,320 
feet from the existing well on' the unit and not closer than 660 
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fee t froai the ex ter ior boundary of the u n i t . No two v e i l s may be 
d r i l l e d in any d r i l l i n g unit v i th in the same governmental quarter 
sec t ion or equivalent l e t . 
G. If an operator e l ec t s to i n i t i a l l y complete a vei l 
sole ly v i t h i n producing formations tha t are separate and d i s i inc t 
from and not in communication v i th any other producing formation, 
the operator wi l l use reasonable precaut ions in order tha t such 
v e i l i s no : completed in any producing formation tha t may be 
e f fec t ive ly drained by any other ve i l* 
E. Second or t e s t v e i l s d r i l l e d under previous orders 
as ve i l as add i t iona l ve i l s to be d r i l l e d under t h i s order may be 
produced s imultaneously-vi th i n i t i a l v e i l s . 
I . The Board r e t a in s exclus ive and continuing 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l l matters covered by t h i s order and of a l l 
p a r t i e s affected thereby and p a r t i c u l a r l y t ha t the Board re ta ins 
and reserves exclusive and continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n to make 
fur ther orders as appropriate and authorized by s t a t u t e and 
appl icable r egu la t i ons . 
ENTERED t h i s t~l—day of ^T V r* f 19 85 . 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
LLIAMS, Chairman 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARK C. MOENCH 
A s s i s t a n t A t to rney General 
ADDENDUM #3 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION 
OF ANR PRODUCTION COMPANY 
FOR AN ORDER SPECIFYING 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY S.H. 
BENNION AS A NON-CONSENTING 
OWNER UNDER FORCED POOLING 
ORDER COVERING SECTION 1, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 
5W-USM, DUCHESNE COUNTY, 
UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
DOCKET NO. 90-021 
CAUSE NO. 139-63 
Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of ANR 
Production Company (ANR), this cause was initially heard before 
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural 
Resources, on Thursday, May 24, 1990, at 10:00 a.m. in the 
Boardroom of the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North 
Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
At the hearing of May 24, 1990, arguments of the 
parties were heard.. The following Board members were present at 
the hearing: 
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
Richard B. Larsen 
Judy F. Lever 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as 
well as board member John M. Garr 
The Board was represented by Alan S. Bachman, Esq., 
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah. 
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining 
were made by Dianne Nielson, Director, Oil, Gas and Mining, and 
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas, and John R. 
Baza, Petroleum Engineer. 
ANR was represented by John Harrington, Esq., and David 
M. Laraime, Sr. Landman. Bennion was represented by Peter 
Stirba, Esq. 
The Board took the matter under advisement and 
requested legal counsel from the Office of the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah. 
On or about June 26, 1990, the Secretary of the Board 
transmitted to Petitioner, Respondent's counsel and the Division 
of Oil, Gas and Mining the list of six issues with respect to 
which the Board wished further legal briefing. On July 25, 1990, 
after receiving leave to file Amicus Curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil 
and Gas Association (RMOGA) filed a Brief and Response to the 
questions piresented by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining on June 
21, 1990. The parties Briefs have been considered by the Board. 
On August 23, 1990, pursuant to notice, a continuation of the 
original hearing was held in the Boardroom of the Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 
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301, Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board members were 
present: 
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman 
Richard B. Larsen 
Judy F. Lever 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Kent G. Stringham 
Chairman Gregory P. Williams having recused himself, as 
well as board member John M. Garr. 
The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq., 
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah. 
Appearances for the Division for Oil, Gas and Mining 
were made by Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas. 
Neither the Petitioners nor Respondent were present. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the 
testimony adduced and the exhibits reviewed in all said hearings 
and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and 
purpose of the May 24, 1990 hearing was given to all interested 
parties as required by law and the rules and regulations of the 
Board. ANR put on evidence regarding the cost of drilling to 
date and the estimated costs of drilling to completion of the 
Miles 2-1B5 well. Further, ANR presented testimony and other 
evidence of its position concerning the risk incurred by the 
consenting interest owners in the drilling of the Miles 2-1B5 
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well. S.H. Bennion, through counsel, argued the legal points set 
forth in his written response, but submitted no evidence in 
rebuttal to ANR's evidence concerning risk of drilling on the 
Miles 2-1B5 well. The cause was continued by the Board and 
further argument in the form of briefs to specific questions of 
the Board has been provided by counsel and Amicus Curiae. This 
cause was heard again on August 23, 1990, with due and regular 
notice of the time, place and purpose of the hearing having been 
given to all interested parties as required by law and the rules 
of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
of the Request for Agency Action and over all parties interested 
therein and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the order 
hereinafter set forth. 
3. The Request for Agency Action in this matter is a 
request to modify the order in Cause No. 139-13, specifying the 
percentage of costs to be recovered by all consenting owners of 
the Miles 2-1B5 well, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
USM, Duchesne County, Utah, (hereinafter "Miles 2-1B5 well"). 
The order in Cause No. 139-13 dated April 30, 1981, and effective 
July 26, 1979, force pooled the drilling unit created by the 
order of this Board in Cause No. 139-3. 
Specifically the Request for Agency Action sought 
relief as follows: 
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(a) That the consenting owners of the the Miles 2-1B5 
well be reimbursed for S.H. Bennion's share, a non-consenting 
mineral interest owner, of the costs out of production from the 
unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's interests; 
(b) That the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5 well 
own and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 2-
1B5 well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations 
payable out of production until the consenting owners have been 
paid the amount due under the terms of the modified order 
relating to the subject drilling unit; 
(c) That each consenting owner of the Miles 2-1B5 well 
be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar 
obligations, the share of the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to its 
interest in the separate drilling units and unless the consenting 
owners agreed otherwise, its proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's 
share of such production until costs are recovered; 
(d) That Bennion be entitled to receive, subject to 
royalty or similar obligations, the share of the production from 
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to S.H. Bennion's interest in the 
subject drilling unit after the consenting interest owners 
recover from S.H. Bennion's share of production the following: 
(i) 100% of the non-consenting owner's share 
of the costs of service equipment beyond the wellhead 
connections, plus 100% of the non-consenting owner's 
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share of the cost of operation of the well commencing 
with the first production and continuing until the 
consenting owners have recovered these costs; and 
(ii) 200% of that portion of the costs and 
expenses of staking the location, well-site 
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling, 
reworking, deepening, or plugging back, testing, 
completing, and the cost of equipment in the well, 
after deducting any cash contributions received by 
the consenting owner; 
(iii) Interest charged in the amount of the 
prime lending rate as periodically determined by-
Citibank of New York, N.A., plus two percentage points, 
(e) That S.H. Bennion's ownership result in S.H. 
Bennion receiving as a royalty, the average landowner's royalty 
attributable to each tract within the subject drilling unit, 
determined prior to the commencement of drilling, and payable 
from the production allocated to each tract until the consenting 
owners recovered the cost described in paragraphs (d), (i), (ii), 
and (iii) set forth above. 
4. The Board's previously entered order in Cause No. 
139-13 force pooled all interests in the subject drilling unit, 
finding, inter alia, that S.H. Bennion was the record owner of an 
unleased, undivided, one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas 
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and minerals located in the northeast quarter, southwest quarter, 
and northwest quarter, southeast quarter, of Section 1, Township 
2 South, Range 5 West, Uinta Special Meridian, Duchesne County, 
Utah. Further, the order held that Shell Oil Company, the 
majority working interest owner and the sole operator of the 
subject drilling unit, was willing to allow S.H. Bennion to share 
in the proceeds of production of that unit from first production 
in the Tew No. 1-1B5 well (hereinafter "Tew 1-1B5") as the 
designated production well capable of producing oil and gas in 
commercial quantities in the subject drilling unit. The order 
made no findings concerning the sharing of costs between 
consenting and non-consenting owners. 
5. This original forced pooling order and S.H. 
Bennion's interest in the pooling unit as set forth in the Cause 
No. 139-13 was determined prior to amendments to the forced 
pooling statute in 1977. Section 40-6-6 (6), Utah Code Ann. 
6. On August 1, 1986, Petitioner ANR succeeded to the 
interest of Shell .Oil Company in the subject drilling unit and 
took over operation of the Tew 1-1B5 effective December 1, 1986. 
7. Effective July 1983, the Utah Legislature repealed 
the then existing Oil and Gas Conservation Act and enacted a new 
statute. On April 12, 1985, this Board as enpowered by the 1983 
Legislature entered its order in Cause No. 139-42 authorizing the 
drilling and simultaneous production^of two wells from each 
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drilling unit in the Greater Altamont-Bluebell-Cedar Rim-Sink 
Area in which Section 1 the subject drilling unit and wells are 
located. 
8. On February 6, 1990, ANR commenced the Miles 2-1B5 
well in Section 1 as the increased density second well in 
Section 1. 
9. On May 24, 1990, arguments of the parties in this 
cause and matter were heard and ANR put on evidence regarding the 
cost of drilling to date, the estimated costs of drilling to 
completion and the basis for its requests for a 200% non-consent 
penalty. S.H. Bennion put on no evidence in rebuttal. 
10. On June 21, 1990, the Board submitted questions to 
the parties for further briefing. 
11. The Board in reviewing its order in Cause No. 
139-13 determines that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances since the entry of that order. The Board finds 
that the change in statutory authority authorizing the drilling 
and simultaneous production of more than one well in the subject 
drilling unit, the geological and economic evidence supporting 
its order in Cause No. 139-42 and the subsequent February 6, 1990 
commencement of the Miles 2-1B5 well as an increased density well 
in the subject drilling unit, constitute changes in circumstances 
sufficient to support modification of its order in Cause No. 
139-13. 
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12. Additionally, the Board in reviewing its order in 
Cause No. 139-13 determines that the order is silent as to the 
rights of consenting and non-consenting interest owners under the 
pooling order concerning reimbursement for costs out of 
production and share of production. The Board therefore finds 
that regulation of operations in this forced pooling unit must be 
modified and supplemented upon terms that are just and 
reasonable. 
13. The Board finds that the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act of 1983, 1983 Utah Laws Chapter 205 provides the applicable 
statutory grounds on which to base its modified order- The Board 
finds that all critical facts before the Board concerning this 
Request for Agency Action occurred after the 1983 legislation was 
enacted. The Board finds the following facts to be critical: 
(a) Increased density production wells were first 
specifically authorized by the Utah Legislature in the 1983 Act. 
(See Utah Code Ann. Section 40-6-6(4) (Supp. 1990).) This 
Board's order dated April 12f 1985, in Cause No. 139-63 
authorized the drilling of second wells for simultaneous 
production because it found that one well per drilling unit was 
not adequately draining the pool? 
(b) The Miles 2-1B5 well was drilled as a second well 
under the Board's increased density order after 1983; and 
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(c) Prior to the above-stated events, this Board's 
order in Cause No. 139-13 would not have required modification 
because no additional wells could have been drilled. 
14. S.H. Bennion has not entered into any prior 
agreement with consenting interest owners which supplants the 
statutory authority and duty of this board to impose costs as 
provided under § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
15. That within the range of 150% to 200% of the 
mandatory non-consent penalty provided under § 40-6-6(6)(b), Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended), there is sufficient evidence of 
risk incurred by the consenting owner that a penalty of 175% is 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. All interests in the subject drilling unit were 
force pooled by order of this Board as of July 26, 1979. 
2. The Board has the necessary and inherent authority, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 and 40-6-6, (1953 as 
amended) to amend,^ modify or supplement its previous pooling 
orders where there has been a substantial change in circumstances 
or an omission in a prior order and where failure to modify the 
order would result in the continued enforcement of terms which 
are not just and reasonable or which would fail to protect 
correlative rights. 
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4. The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will 
prevent the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and 
protect correlative rights. 
Sufficient evidence now being available upon which to 
reach a decision, the Board issues the following: 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The order previously entered in Cause No. 139-13 is 
amended to provide that the consenting owners of the Miles 2-1B5 
well shall be reimbursed from S.H. Bennion's share of costs out 
of the production from the unit attributable to S.H. Bennion's 
interests. 
2. Consenting owners from the subject unit shall own 
and be entitled to receive all production from the Miles 2-1B5 
well applicable to each tract or interest and obligations payable 
out of production until the consenting owners have been paid the 
amount due under the terms of this order relating to the subject 
drilling unit. 
3. Each consenting interest owner in the unit will be 
entitled to receive, subject to royalty or other similar 
obligations, his or her share of production of the Miles 2-1B5 
well applicable to their interest in the drilling unit and, its 
proportionate part of S.H. Bennion's share or such production 
until costs are recovered. 
-11-
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4. S.H. Bennion shall be entitled to receive, subject 
to royalty or similar obligations, his share of production from 
the Miles 2-1B5 well applicable to his interest in the subject 
drilling unit after the consenting owners have recovered from 
S.H. Bennion7s share of production the following: 
(a) 100% of S.H. Bennion's share as non-
consenting owner of the cost of surface 
equipment beyond the well head connections plus 
100% of the non-consenting owners share of the costs 
of operation of the well commencing with the first 
production and continuing until the consenting owners 
have retrieved these costs; 
(b) 175% of that portion of the costs and 
expenses of staking the location, well-side 
preparation, rights of way, rigging up, drilling, re-
working, deepening, or plugging back, testing, com-
pleting, and the cost of equipment in the well after 
deducting any cash contributions received by the 
consenting owners; and 
(c) Interest on these amounts is to be 
assessed at the amount of the prime lending rate as 
periodically determined by Citibank of New York, NA, 
plus two percentage points. 
(d) S.H. Bennion/s interest not currently 
being subject to lease or other contract development 
of oil and gas, S.H. Bennion is entitled to receive 
as royalty, the average landowner's royalty 
attributable to each tract within the subject 
drilling unit, effective as of the date prior to the 
commencement of the drilling of the well on the subject 
drilling unit. 
5. To the extent that any previous order of the Board 
is inconsistent with this order, those orders are hereby vacated 
to the extent of such inconsistency. 
6. The Board retains exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction over all matters covered by this order and over all 
the parties affected thereby and particularly reserves exclusive 
and continuing jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate 
and as authorized by statute and regulation. 
DATED this O y Q day of &QpsU^ L&W- f 1990. 
STATE OF UTAH 
DARD OF OIL, GAS^AND MINING 
S W. CARTER 
ING CHAIRMAN 
